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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN WEST
VIRGINIA-DISCRETIONARY NOTICE AND
DUE PROCESS
Preliminary injunctions are a major form of equitable relief
which are made available under Rule 65 of both the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
The primary distinguishing characteristic between the two is that
a preliminary injunction in West Virginia may be issued without
notice to the party sought to be enjoined. Because of that charac-
teristic, the West Virginia rule is of questionable constitutionality.
To understand why, it is helpful to compare the West Virginia rule
with the federal rule.
Essentially, the federal rule provides for the granting of tem-
porary restraining orders which can last up to ten days and which
may be granted ex parte under limited situations as sworn to by
the plaintiff.' The basic requirements are (1) certification of at-
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 65 provides:
(a) Preliminary Injunction.
(1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice
to the adverse party.
(2) Consolidation of Hearing with Trial on Merits. Before or after the
commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be
advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even
when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an
application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible upon
the trial on the merits becomes part of the record on the trial and need
not be repeated upon the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so con-
strued and applied as to save to the parties any rights they may have to
trial by jury.
(b) Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration. A
temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice
to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that imme-
diate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and
(2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if
any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting
his claim that notice should not be required. Every temporary restraining
order granted without notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of
issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of re-
cord; shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the
order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its terms within
such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless
1
Pepper: Preliminary Injunctions in West Virginia--Discretionary Notice an
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tempts made to notify the other party; and (2) an allegation that
immediate and irreparable injury will occur before the adverse
party can be notified and heard. When a temporary restraining
order is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary in-
junction is heard as soon .as possible and given preference over all
other matters. If the affiant fails to proceed with an application for
a preliminary injunction, the court dissolves the temporary re-
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for
a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed
consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the
extension shall be entered of record. In case a temporary restraining order
is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall
be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence
of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the
motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary re-
straining order shall proceed with the application for a preliminary in-junction and, if he does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary
restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the party who obtained the tempo-
rary restraining order without notice or dn such shorter notice to that
party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move
its dissolution or modification and in that event the court shall proceed
to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice
require.
(c) Security. No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall
issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as
the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be required of
the United States or of an officer or agency thereof.
The provisions of Rule 65.1 apply to a surety upon a bond or under.
taking under this rule.
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order
granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in rea-
sonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the
parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and at-
torneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with
them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or other-
wise.
(e) Employer and Employee; Interpleader; Constitutional Cases.
These rules do not modify any statute of the United States relating to
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in actions af-
fecting employer and employee; or the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C., §
2361, relating to preliminary injunctions in actions of interpleader or in
the nature of interpleader; or Title 28, U.S.C., § 2284, relating to actions
required by Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.
[Vol. 78
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straining order. The federal rule provides that no preliminary in-
junction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party and
allows consolidation of the hearing for a preliminary injunction
with the trial of the action on the merits (the hearing for a perma-
nent injunction).
The West Virginia rule, on the other hand, simply states that
"[t]he practice respecting preliminary injunctions shall be in ac-
cordance with the practice heretofore followed in this State, in-
cluding the use of a verified complaint or supporting affidavit."
The general statutory provision concerning the issuance of prelimi-
nary injunctions is Chapter 53, Article 5, Section 8 of the West
Virginia Code.
The West Virginia rule differs most with the corresponding
federal rule in respect to the stringent federal requirements of no-
tice and hearing as conditions precedent to the granting of
interlocutory injunctive relief. The failure of the West Virginia rule
to require some notice to the other side has rendered it constitu-
tionally suspect.
According to the West Virginia statute, "[A]ny court or judge
may require that reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse
party, or his attorney at law, or in fact, of the time and place of
moving for it, before the injunction is awarded, if in the opinion of
the court or judge it be proper that such notice should be given."2
While the trial court rule3 is somewhat different, the effect is the
same, in that any requirement of notice or hearing is left to the
discretion of the court.
Despite the possible constitutional deficiency of the West Vir-
ginia procedure, the related case law supports the discretionary
notice requirement, which has had a relatively unfettered exist-
ence since its inception in 1849.1 The first constitutional attack was
quelled in 1903, when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that a trial judge has authority to exercise sound discretion
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966).
3W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. V(c) provides, "No application for an injunction...
shall be considered by the Court, unless interested parties or their counsel are
notified of the place where and the time when such application shall be made. This
rule, however, for reasons deemed sufficient to the court may be disregarded. . ....
(emphasis added). This rule was promulgated by an order entered July 22, 1960,
thereby superceding W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 which was enacted in 1955.
Compare VA. CODE 1849, c. 179, §3, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966).
3
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in the matter of notice to the adverse party.5 Historically, the
justification has been that a preliminary injunction is an extraordi-
nary proceeding and that the legislature expressly dispenses with
some procedural requisites normally indispensible in regular pro-
ceedings.' To date the West Virginia court has consistently upheld
the statutory delegation of discretion concerning the notice re-
quirement.'
However, an interesting parallel appears in a 1906 case,
Powhaton Coal and Coke v. Ritz.' At issue in this case was a
preliminary injunction, and the court stated that when the effect
of such an interlocutory decree is to deprive one of property with-
out notice and hearing it is violative of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion The court relied heavily on the reluctance of equity courts
to grant mandatory interlocutory relief except in cases where there
is a showing of "extreme hardship"'" and a "clear right" to the
relief,1' and where "extreme or very serious damage will ensue from
withholding that relief."' 2
Kalbitzer v. Goodhue, 52 W. Va. 435, 438, 44 S.E. 264, 265 (1903).
6 Owens v. Evans, 104 W. Va. 102, 104, 139 S.E. 476, 477 (1927); Lamp v.
Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 149, 108 S.E. 889, 894 (1921); Cooper v. Bennett, 70 W. Va.
110, 112, 73 S.E. 260, 261 (1911).
7 Highland v. Empire Bank, 114 W. Va. 473, 172 S.E. 544 (1933); Owens v.
Evans, 104 W. Va. 102, 139 S.E. 476 (1927); Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108
S.E. 889 (1921); Powhaton Coal and Coke v. Ritz, 60W. Va. 395, 56 S.E. 257 (1906);
Kalbitzer v. Goodhue, 52 W. Va. 435, 44 S.E. 264 (1903).
60 W. Va. 395, 56 S.E. 257 (1906).
"[A]n injunction, awarded without notice or hearing, requiring the defen-
dant to yield to the plaintiff the possession of property, real or personal, which at
the time of the awarding of the injunction was in possession of the former under a
perfect title thereto, or a bona fide claim of title, is null and void." Id. at 405, 56
S.E. at 261. W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 10 states, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and a judgment of his peers." In
Crossland v. Crossland, 53 W. Va. 108, 44 S.E. 424 (1903), a preliminary injunction
which was awarded without notice to the defendant, enjoining him from interfering
with the sale of certain personal property, and which was served on him on the
morning of the sale, was held violative of this section. See also Bertman v. Harness,
42 W. Va. 433, 441, 26 S.E. 271, 273 (1896).
60 W. Va. 395, 401, 56 S.E. 257, 259 (1906).
" Id.
' Id. at 402, 56 S.E. at 259. But the Court also recognized that the function of
a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final hearing, where
the court can grant full relief, and therefore, when maintaining the status quo
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More recently, in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden,'3 the Su-
preme Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of another
ex parte procedure, the statutory distress warrant. 4 By an ex parte
affidavit presented to a justice of the peace, a landlord, by statute,
could effect the issuance of a "distress warrant" allowing a con-
stable to levy and seize the personal property of the tenant and sell
it at a public auction in order to satisfy the rent allegedly in ar-
rears." The statute did not provide the tenant any notice and
hearing prior to the deprivation of his property. The tenant's only
recourse prior to the sale was to post a bond with the levying officer
in an amount up to twice the amount of the distrained property
or to exempt from execution up to $200 worth of personal prop-
erty.' 6
The prior cases had held that such taking of property without
notice was not violative of the West Virginia Constitution because
all that was involved was a temporary inconvenience which could
be rectified by subsequent proceedings.'7 But in Payne the Court
reversed its prior decisions by declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional. The Court found the ex parte procedure to be a "legitimized
form of harrassment to bring the tenant to the landlord's out
stretched hand"'8 that denies the tenant due process of law guaran-
teed by the West Virginia Constitution and the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 9
13 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-12 (1966).
Is W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-14 (1966). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-19
(1966).
"s W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1974). However, this exemption was not
available to an unmarried adult tenant without children.
11 State ex rel. Myers v. Hodge, 129 W. Va. 820, 42 S.E.2d 23 (1947); Beirne v.
Snyder, 114 W. Va. 691, 173 S.E. 570 (1934); Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163
S.E. 845 (1932); Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S.E. 998 (1898).
Is 190 S.E.2d 770, 778 (W Va. 1972).
" Id. The court has defined the term due process of law as "the due course of
legal proceedings . . .security to every person a judicial trial before he can be
deprived of life, liberty, or property." McHenry v. Humes, 112 W. Va. 432, 435, 164
S.E. 501, 503 (1932). It requires that such persons shall have notice and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard before any adjudication of his rights is made. State v.
Blevins, 131 W. Va. 350, 48 S.E.2d 174 (1948). It requires that every defendant be
given his day in court. State ex rel. Staley v. Hereford, 131 W. Va. 84, 45 S.E.2d
738 (1947). But see Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1974) where Justice Neely,
by dicta, interprets Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) as permitting
ex parte self-help, in the form of taking possession "without breach of the peace,"
as a product of a rational legislative balancing of the interests of the debtor and
creditor. For discussion of Mitchell see notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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Coupling the due process considerations discussed in Payne
with the Court's holding in Powhaton, a convincing argument
emerges that the West Virginia preliminary injunction procedure
is inconsistent with the West Virginia Constitution. Notice of the
time and place of the motion for the preliminary injunction is
discretionary with the presiding judge, thus not guaranteeing the
constitutionally mandated due process. Justice Maxwell of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was concerned about
the possibility of abuse of discretion, and in 1933 urged judges
across the state not to dispense with notice and hearing except in
the cases of "greatest urgency.""0 He advised that there be "great-
est hesitancy on the part of the trial chancellor in granting injunc-
tions without notice. 2 1
In Payne and Powhaton the deprivations without notice in-
volved personal property, but the question arises as to the constitu-
tionality of these procedures when one is, without notice, prelimi-
narily enjoined from indulging in some behavior or activity not
related to "property." As a practical matter, "property" has been
held in West Virginia to include such a myriad of interests that few
preliminary injunctions could be said not to deprive one of "prop-
erty. '22 But in the pure nonproperty case, where a preliminary
injunction is issued and "liberty" or "life" is deprived without
notice or hearing, the constitutional mandate is equally clear.23
The term "liberty," as defined in West Virginia, includes
nearly all legal behavior and activity, including "the right of man
to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been
endowed. . . the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways,
to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. 24 Although
20 Highland v. Empire Bank, 114 W. Va. 473, 486, 172 S.E. 544, 550 (1933)
(dissenting opinion).
21 Id.
22 In Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915), property was
deemed to include not only tangible or real property but the right to use and enjoy
it to its full extent. But see State ex rel. Thompson v. Morton, 140 W. Va, 207, 84
S.E.2d 791 (1954) and Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S.E. 274 (1899) where
public office was held not to be "property" within the meaning of the due process
clause.
2 W. VA. CONST. art 3, § 10.
24 State v. Memorial Gardens Dev. Corp., 143 W. Va. 182, 190, 101 S.E.2d 425
429-30 (1957); Lawrence v. Barlow, 77 W. Va. 289, 292, 87 S.E. 380, 381 (1915). But
the Court expressly subordinates this right to liberty to "such restraints as are
[Vol. 78
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the current procedure would allow speedy termination of unlawful
behavior or speedy appropriation of property into the proper
hands, it also allows unconstitutional termination of life, liberty,
and property. Balancing the two interests, as the Court did in
Payne and Powhaton, one can only conclude that a statute that
permits ex parte deprivation of essential rights without notice and
hearing is constitutionally infirm.
The West Virginia statute allows procedures essentially ident-
ical to others which have historically been abused and subse-
quently invalidated or eliminated. For example, a marked similar-
ity exists between the ex parte proceeding provided for in the West
Virginia statute and rule and the procedure used by employers
against striking employees prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act,"
where upon affidavit they were able to obtain temporary restrain-
ing orders which resolved labor disputes and strikes in their favor."
This "government by injunction" became the target of great pub-
lic uproar which culminated in the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, limiting the jurisdiction and power of federal
courts to enjoin picketing, strikes and boycotts connected with
"labor disputes" and requiring a hearing before an injunction can
be granted. Notice to the adverse party is required as well, except
in cases where "irreparable injury" would ensue."
necessary for the common welfare." State ex rel. Bowen v. Flowers 155 W. Va. 389,
184 S.E.2d 611 (1971) acknowledges that notice and hearing are fundamental due
process requirements, but may be postponed for a reasonable time, where there is
an overriding public interest involved. See also Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency
Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974), and Hubel v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975). Is the common welfare or an overrid-
ing public interest promoted by ex parte preliminary injunctions without notice?
If so, does W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966) promote a public interest or the
common welfare as narrowly as possible in order to effectively preserve the common
welfare without overextending against other individual rights?
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964); see Perlman, The Little Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the New York Courts, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 316 (1950); Milk Drivers' Union v.
Lake Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91, 102 (1940).
11 The union's activity was effectively terminated because of lack of funds, loss
of public support, and loss of morale and the necessary critical timing. F. FRANK-
FURTER AND N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 79, 80 (1930); M. SHARP AND C.
GREGORY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND LABOR LAW 130 (1939). See generally 35 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 504, 506-7 (1969).
Milk Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91, 102 (1940).
28 Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 323 (1953); CCH LAB. L. COURSE 4301, at 5311, 4327,
at 5316, 4328, at 5317 (17th ed. 1967); CCH LAB. L. REP. 1530, at 5314-15.
7
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Other examples of the more flagrant abuses upon which the
United States Supreme Court has felt compelled to rule involve
deprivation of an individual's first amendment rights without no-
tice. In two cases involving state statutes permitting search and
seizure of purportedly obscene materials without prior adjudica-
tion or hearing on their alleged obscenity, the lack of prior adver-
sary hearing was held determinative of the unconstitutionality of
the statutes.29 In Friedman v. Maryland,3" the Court held that
"only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, [and] only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a
valid final restraint."'31
In Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne,32
the Court again considered a state statute which involved depriva-
tion of an individual's first amendment rights. In that case, a
Maryland statute which allowed the ex parte issuance of a ten day
temporary restraining order, without notice or a showing that it
was impossible to notify the opposing party, was applied
unconstitutionally. The Court reaffirmed the previously an-
nounced "heavy presumption" against the validity of a system of
prior restraints.3 3 The Court then conceded that "[t]here is a
place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of
temporary restraining orders of short duration,"34 and left open the
question of when such orders are valid.Y However, the Court men-
tioned only two situations where such issuances might be constitu-
tional. One is where the adverse party or its counsel is unavailable"
29 See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) and A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). Cf. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) where
the Court upheld seizure of allegedly obscene film without a prior adversary hear-
ing. The distinguishing factor, however, between that case and A Quantity of
Books, supra and Marcus, supra, was, according to the court, that the copy of the
film was temporarily detained as evidence and was not "subjected to any form of
'final restraint,' in the sense of being enjoined from exhibition or threatened with
destruction." 413 U.S. at 490.
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
' Id. at 58.
32 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
3 Id. at 181. See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
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and the other is where speech is so interlaced with violence that it
loses its first amendment protection."
The West Virginia statute38 is inconsistent with the Court's
constitutional interpretation in two vital respects. First, while the
Carroll decision deals with temporary restraining orders of short
duration (ten days), the West Virginia statute permits ex parte
issuance of preliminary injunctions which do not necessarily last
for a "short duration." The ex parte preliminary injunctions issued
in West Virginia without notice last until "any party to the pro-
ceedings . . . move[s] for a hearing on any particular issues or
phases of the case which may properly be heard interlocutorily."
Only then may the court or judge dismiss the injunction.3 9 Thus
in West Virginia, the ex parte deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty is not necessarily temporary, but may last for months or years.
A second inconsistency between the West Virginia provision
and the constitutional mandates in Carroll concerns the Court's
implied holding that a statutory provision that requires a showing
of impossibility of finding or notifying the adverse party or its
counsel would "save" the Maryland statute from unconstitu-
tionality." In West Virginia no such impossibility need be shown.
Nor are there statutory safeguards requiring allegations of "irre-
parable harm," "speech interlaced with violence," or some other
31 Id. at 180. The Court quoted Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940):
"[n]o one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of
speech sanctions incitement to riot." Id. at 308. The Supreme Court has allowed
deprivation without notice or hearing of certain property interests in a few limited
situations: to collect the internal revenue taxes due the United States, Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); to meet the needs of war, Bowles v. Wil-
lingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvon, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); Stoeher v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239
(1921); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921); to protect the economy from
bank failure, Fahey v. Mallonce, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); to protect the public from
misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); and
to protect the public from contaminated food, North American Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See also Krohn-Hite Corp. v. Berube, 372 F. Supp.
1262 (D. Mass. 1974), where the ex parte granting of a temporary restraining order
under Massachusetts law was held unconstitutional because there existed no ex-
traordinary situation where some valid governmental interest was at stake.
3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966).
' Id.
40 393 U.S. at 180. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) where a condition precedent to
the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice is certification by the
applicant's attorney in writing of the efforts, if any, which have been made to give
the adverse party notice.
9
Pepper: Preliminary Injunctions in West Virginia--Discretionary Notice an
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
situation where the preliminary injunction could be constitution-
ally issued." The only criterion that must be set in West Virginia
in that the court or judge must be "satisfied . . .of the plaintiff's
equity."' 2 Furthermore, there need not even be affidavits filed,
since the judge may be satisfied by "affidavits or otherwise."43
The primary distinction of the Carroll case is that the conduct
enjoined there was the holding of political rallies or meetings pro-
tected by the first amemdment. A good deal of the language in
Carroll is couched in terms of basic first amendment rights.
"[T]here is no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is made
that it is impossible to serve or notify the opposing parties and to
give them an opportunity to participate."" As opposed to other
first amendment modes of expression, the notice requirement was
deemed more compelling in Carroll because it involved a rally and
a political speech rather than books, literature or other forms of
"social expression." The distinguishing feature there was the ele-
ment of timeliness inherent in political expression." The apparent
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966). Federal rule 65 requires "a verified com-
plaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition
." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
42 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966).
"3 Id. The requirement of anything that satisfies the judge of the plaintiff's
equity has been held sufficient under this section. McGregor v. Camden, 47 W. Va.
193, 34 S.E. 936 (1899). Even if the affidavit is not in itself sufficient, the judge
may be satisfied by other documents filed with the affidavit. Oil Run Petroleum
Co. v. Gale, 6 W. Va. 525 (1873). But see Shonk v. Knight, 12 W. Va. 667 (1878)
where the court held that no injunction can be awarded upon an affidavit filed by
a third party.
" 393 U.S. at 180. "In the present case, it is clear that the failure to give notice,
formal or informal, and to provide an opportunity for an adversary proceeding
before the holding of the rally was restrained, is incompatible with the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 185. "The facts in any case involving a public demonstration are...
difficult to evaluate. In the absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides
and of their participation ... there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analy-
sis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment
adjudication." Id. at 183.
11 Id. at 182. The Court quoted favorably from A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964), where Mr. Justice Harlan distinguished political and social
expression. "It is vital in the operation of democratic government that the citizens
have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A delay of even a day or two
may be of crucihl importance in some instances. On the other hand, the subject of
sex is of constant but rarely particularly topical interest." Id. at 224. See also New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). But see Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
[Vol. 78
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fear was that minority expression and political input could be
stifled by a majority by means of the ex parte injunction.
It is conceivable that the application of this case to the West
Virginia statute could be limited to situations where the target of
the preliminary injunction is first amendment behavior, or, in the
extreme, situations involving timely first amendment political
expression. Even if Carroll were considered a due process mandate,
it could still be interpreted as applicable only when first amend-
ment rights are abridged, and its impact upon the West Virginia
procedure would be limited.
On the federal level, three West Virginia statutes have been
declared unconstitutional by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia: the summary distress war-
rant, an attachment and garnishment procedure, and the improver
lien statutes.
In Shaffer v. Holbrook,4" the court ruled unconstitutional the
West Virginia summary distress procedure, basing the holding on
the absence of an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure, which
deprived the tenant of his property without due process of law as
required by the fourteenth amendment. 7 Although the defendant
had a right to get a quick hearing on the merits after the taking,
the three-judge court held that such postseizure remedy is not a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a prior hearing. 8
Similarly, the West Virginia attachment and garnishment
procedure was declared unconstitutional in Union Barge Line
Corp. v. Marble Cliff Quarries Co.49 There a corporation had gar-
nished the receipts of a sale through which the defendant corpora-
tion sought to transfer its assets. Although the court recognized
that protection of creditors from fraudulent alienation of assets
could reach the level of an "important governmental or general
public interest" allowing ex parte deprivation, the crucial factor
was the absence of a provision for a prior consideration by a state
official of the probable validity of the claim.
The third federal district court decision, Straley v. Gassaway
Motor Company,"o invalidated the West Virginia improver's lien
46 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
Id. at 766.
I' d.
" 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
,O 359 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
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statutes,' under which the improver-lien holders had an "auto-
matic lien" on the improved property in their possession and
could, without prior adjudication or hearing, advertise and sell the
property to satisfy whatever debt they claimed. Citing heavily
from Shaffer, the court declared the statutes void under the due
process provisions of the fourteenth amendment, since the im-
prover was not required to institute an action or to even make an
affidavit prior to depriving one of his property.
These federal decisions, as well as the West Virginia case of
State ex rel. Payne v. Walden,5" relied heavily on two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.53 and Fuentes v. Shevin.5' These Supreme Court cases, and
their relation to ex parte deprivation of property rights,55 merit a
close examination and then re-evaluation in light of the more re-
cent Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co."0
In Sniadach, a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment proce-
dure was declared unconstitutional as violative of due process.
Determinative of the statute's unconstitutionality was that it sub-
mitted an alleged creditor ex parte to garnish and freeze the de-
fendant debtor's wages without notice or a chance to be heard. The
debtor had no opportunity to tender any defense prior to being
deprived of what the Court called "wages-a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,"5
the deprivation of which "may impose tremendous hardship on
wage earners with families."58
In Fuentes, the Court declared unconstitutional the prejudg-
s, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966) and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-14 (Supp.
1974). The latter does require notice to the owner of when his property is going to
be sold; however, the legal right of the improver to sell is established without notice
and hearing. See generally Note, Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of Garagemen's
Liens, 54 BOST. U.L. REV. 542 (1974).
32 190 S.E. 770 (W. Va. 1972).
53 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
' 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Other Supreme Court cases requiring notice and hearing prior to property
deprivation include Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Opp Cotton Mills v. Adminis-
trator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457
(1934); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915). See 26 U. MMmI L.
REV. 823 (1972) for a basic overview.
56 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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ment replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania," which al-
lowed the creditor, ex parte without notice or prior hearing, to
obtain a writ of replevin by posting a bond for double the value of
the property to be replevied. The sheriff, by statute, was then
required to seize the property, thereby executing the writ. The
Court, in a 4-3 decision," declared these statutes unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment as deprivations of property with-
out due process of law.
Both Sniadach and Fuentes deal at length with the right to
notice and hearing as a prerequisite to deprivation of one's consti-
tutionally protected property rights. However, the current state of
the law in this area and the import of these cases has been seriously
altered, or at least confused, by the 1974 case of Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co.' The fact situation there was similar to that in Fuentes,
but the Court held the Louisiana procedure for obtaining writs of
sequestration constitutional. The determinative elements of the
statute in Mitchell62 were: (1) the writs of sequestration were issued
by judges, not clerks, as in Fuentes; (2) the plaintiff creditor had
to allege in his affidavit "specific facts" which clearly show a
ground for relief; (3) there was an immediate hearing and dissolu-
tion of the writ when the plaintiff could not prove the grounds upon
which the writ was issued; and (4) under Louisiana law, if there
were a transfer by the debtor of the property, the creditor lost his
lien.
Sniadach was distinguished from Mitchell mainly because of
the emphasis on the special property nature of wages. However,
the Court also emphasized the added statutory protections assured
the debtor in Mitchell, and that the creditor had a prior interest
in the property attached." This distinction is essential to a consid-
eration of the constitutionality of the West Virginia preliminary
injunction statute. 4
-, Like the West Virginia injunction statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966),
the Pennsylvania statute considered in Fuentes did not require that there ever be
an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the claim. The party whose property
is taken, like the preliminarily enjoined party in West Virginia, had to initiate legal
action himself in order to regain the property he owned.
,1 Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in this case.
61 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
42 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
63 Id.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966).
13
Pepper: Preliminary Injunctions in West Virginia--Discretionary Notice an
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The West Virginia statute allows ex parte deprivation of
property and nonproperty interests, and the application of
Mitchell, Fuentes, and Sniadach is limited to deprivation of prop-
erty. Mitchell allowed state protection of the creditor's present
property interest through statutory, ex parte writs of sequestra-
tion. The existence of a vendor's lien and the creditor's current real
interest in the property sequestered are material distinctions to be
noted when applying the Court's holding in Mitchell to the depri-
vation of property allowed under the West Virginia rule." It would,
of course, be possible to posit a situation where a preliminary
injunction under the West Virginia provisions would be used to
protect a present property interest, but such use of the statute
would not be exclusive and, consequently, one could expect fre-
quent usage where no pre-existing property interest was involved."6
While the effect of the West Virginia statute is to allow the protec-
tion approved in Mitchell, it is overly broad in that it also permits
deprivation of property (as well as life and liberty) in which the
affiant has no real, current property interest. 7
11 "Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by the
court is exclusively the property of the debtor .... The reality is that both seller
and buyer had current, real interests in the property ....
With this duality in mind, we are convinced that the Louisiana sequestration
procedure is not invalid. . . ." 416 U.S. at 604. The Court expressed great concern
for the need for protection of the vendor's interest since that interest is subject to
daily use and erosion, and because if given notice, the debtor could convey the
property to someone else who would receive clear title. Id. at 608. An ancillary
argument arises to bolster the constitutionality of issuance of no-notice preliminary
injunctions. In some situations, a defendant given notice could act to the detriment
of the plaintiff thereby fostering injustice and effectively settling the issue in behalf
of the defendant. The difference is that Mitchell involved an easily proven, ordinar-
ily uncomplicated interest, worthy of protection, effectively established by affida-
vit, specific facts, and documentary proof before a judge. Id. at 609. But an appli-
cant for an injunction would rarely have this discernible type of interest warranting
protection from a debtor armed with notice. Of course, under the federal rule thejudge could consider the chances of debtor malfeasance as the section (b)(1) "im-
mediate and irreparable harm."
6 A common "property application" of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-8 (1966)
would involve the preliminary enjoining of a defendant from selling certain goods
or dealing with certain concerns or, more commonly, enjoining the use of one's
property.
11 But in further distinguishing Sniadach the Court summarized the usual rule
as, "[wihere only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial
enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial
determination is adequate." 416 U.S. at 611. The Court also quoted favorably from
Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950), which dealt with mis-
branded drugs: "[W]e have repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary
[Vol. 78
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The main distinction between Fuentes and Mitchell, both of
which involve creditors with current property interests, is that
Fuentes "was decided against a factual and legal background suffi-
ciently different" from that in Mitchell." The Court pointed to the
four determinative elements listed above as adequate safeguards
missing in Fuentes and also denied that there must be a final
adjudication before even a temporary deprivation of possession
would be allowed. The criterion for allowing deprivation of posses-
sion without final adjudication is that the issues decided at the ex
parte hearing are "ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend
themselves to documentary proof." 9 Such reasoning is inapplica-
ble to the issuance of a preliminary injunction under the West
Virginia statute. More is involved than simple allegation of a few
facts; many of the determinative issues involve equitable defenses
such as "laches" or "unclean hands" which warrant consideration
in an adversary context. The issues are complex, dependent upon
questions of fact, subject to many defenses, and less readily proven
by documents such as contracts or lien agreements actually signed
by the absent party. Moreover, the chance of severe harm to the
defendant by an ex parte preliminary injunction is generally
greater than any harm an individual could suffer from a sequestra-
tion of an item of personal property encumbered with a vendor's
lien. Since the scope of preliminary injunctions is virtually unlim-
ited, the potential is great for abuse and catastrophic pre-
judgment deprivation.
In Mitchell, the Court emphasized that the debtor was pro-
tected by a mandatory bond provision which required a bond
sufficient to protect the vendee against all damages in the event
the sequestration is later found to be improper. 0 In West Virginia,
however, the judge awarding the injunction has wide discretion as
stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the
final administrative order becomes effective." Id. at 598. "It is sufficient, where
only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a
hearing and some judicial determination." Id. at 599. These and other cases cited
by the Court allowed prejudgment deprivation, but involved extraordinary govern-
mental and public interests which impliedly justified the deprivation. See note 37,
infra, for other such unique cases. But Mitchell protects a purely private interest;
collection of a debt allegedly due a creditor. It is unclear whether the Court will
adopt the rationale of these extraordinary cases as the controlling due process
standards or will limit any such application to the facts, as in Mitchell.
416 U.S. at 615.
" Id. at 609.
70 Id. at 608.
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to the amount of the bond, or whether to require one at all, with
no statutory guarantee of sufficiency.7' Therefore, there is no safe-
guard in West Virginia, as was found in Mitchell, against procure-
ment of wrongfully issued judicial orders.
Summary and Proposals
Recent case law in West Virginia and on the federal level
reflects a disdain for summary deprivations. Armed with Sniadach
and Fuentes, even the most conservative of judges has found him-
self elaborating on the woes of the unfortunate defendant, who
watches in surprise as men waving pieces of paper signed by the
creditor and clerk cart off the new television, haul out the old
couch, or skim a percentage off the weekly pay check. But with the
Mitchell case, a new counter-interest, worthy of protection,
emerged: the pre-existing property interest of a creditor. While the
West Virginia provisions allowing preliminary injunctions could be
used to effectively protect that interest, it would constitutionally
require a judge whose concept of equity is satisfied only by an
affidavit alleging "specific facts" warranting ex parte deprivation.
But this one constitutionally permissible use of the statute exists
in the face of unlimited possibilities for unconstitutional use remi-
niscent of the "government by injunction" days. The statute per-
mits a simple affidavit to serve as the basis for a judicial order
which could resolve an issue in dispute or even change ownership
of property. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the other
party be notified or heard from, and no guarantee that the affiant
will be ordered to post bond "just in case" he is mistaken.
Other than possible protection of Mitchell-like interests (or
interests deemed to be protectable under Mitchell through later
decisions), what other public or state interests could be furthered
by the West Virginia procedure? Arguably, there are situations
where there is no time to notify the adverse party or there is a
likelihood that, if notified, the adverse party will act unjustly to
the affiant's detriment. This is a "reality" similar to the one in
Mitchell against which the Supreme Court permitted state protec-
tion. An example is debtor alienation or destruction of property
after notice of repossession being initiated.
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows issuance
of a temporary restraining order for up to ten days followed by an
71 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-9 (1966).
[Vol. 78
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adversary hearing on the equity of a preliminary injunction. As a
prerequisite to issuance, however, the court must have "specific
facts" as to the merits of the claim and some justification for not
notifying the other side as well as a bond security. Under this rule
the absent parties are afforded minimum constitutional safe-
guards, shielding them somewhat from prolonged deprivation.
Perhaps a radical shift to the federal rule is not warranted,
given the fact that in practice, nearly all West Virginia judges do
require notice to be given to the other party (even though they are
not required to), and because the West Virginia statute is not
unconstitutional on its face. A compromise position could permit
retention of the preliminary injunction in such a way that tempo-
rary restraining orders would not be needed and, at the same time,
preclude unconstitutional application. To achieve this, several
changes would be necessary. First, require more than "satisfying
the judge of the plaintiffs equities by affidavit or otherwise." A
specific allegation (by affidavit) of determinative facts would be
necessary. The facts required would vary from case to case, given
the unlimited scope of the statute and the myriad interests af-
fected. 2 Second, require specific allegations of why the other party
should not or could not be notified. Third, require posting of a
bond by the affiant in a sum necessary to compensate the defen-
dant in case of misapplication of the statute in every case, except
those expressly exempted by statute.
The major problem which would remain after these changes
would be the unlimited duration of the preliminary injunction ab-
sent affirmative action by the party enjoined. A balancing test
could be utilized here which might tip the scales in favor of the
state's interest in allowing ex parte deprivation as opposed to a
guaranteed right to prior notice and hearing. However, it may be
argued that such a statute does not further such interest as nar-
rowly as is possible. The same state interest could be furthered by
a federal rule-oriented approach using temporary restraining or-
ders of short duration in lieu of indeterminate preliminary injunc-
tions. Such a process would shift the burden of affirmative action
to the affiant, who must, under the federal rule, apply for a prelim-
inary injunction or face dissolution of the temporary restraining
72 See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) for a listing of the specific facts which may be
alleged by affidavit in order to institute constructive service and process by publica-
tion. See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-23 (1966).
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order, and would restrict the length of the ex parte deprivation to
a statutory period.*
William Wade Pepper
*Editors Note: After this article was prepared for publication, the United
States Supreme Court decided the case of North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). The Court declared unconstitutional the prejudgment
garnishment of a debtor corporation's bank account because the statutory proce-
dure: (1) authorized prejudgment garnishment after the filing of a conclusory affi-
davit, rather than one based on "specific facts" as required in Mitchell; (2) failed
to provide for an early hearing to require the creditor to prove the grounds upon
which it was granted; and (3) provided for filing of the affidavit and issuance of
the writ by a clerk of the court rather than a judge.
The important effects of Di-Chem on this article are that: first, the procedural
due process protections present in Mitchell were upheld by the Court and cited in
Di-Chem to distinguish the two cases while the procedure in Di-Chem did not
provide the protection afforded in Mitchell and was struck down; second, the Court
rejected the contention that the posting of a double bond adequately protects the
debtor from improper ex parte deprivations on the ground that "the probability of
irreparable injury . . . is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary
to guard against the risk of initial error," 95 S. Ct. at 723; and, third, the Court
expressly refused to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the
due process clause. Referring to Sniadach and Fuentes the Court stated that, "al-
though the length or severity of a deprivation of use or possession would be another
factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it was not deemed
to be determinative of the right to a hearing of some sort." Id. at 722.
[Vol. 78
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